We develop a numerical life-cycle model with choice over consumption and leisure, stochastic mortality and labor income processes, and calibrated to U.S. data to characterize willingness to pay (WTP) for mortality risk reduction. Our theoretical framework can explain many empirical ndings in this literature, including an inverted-U life-cycle WTP and an order of magnitude dierence in prime-aged adults WTP. By endogenizing leisure and employing multiple income measures, we reconcile the literature's large variation in estimated income elasticities. By accounting for gender-and race-specic stochastic mortality and income processes, we explain the literature's black-white and female-male dierences. JEL codes: J17, D91, Q51
Introduction
From purchasing safe automobiles, to taking vitamins, to exercising at the gym, individuals make decisions everyday that reveal their willingness to pay (WTP) to reduce mortality risk. Government agencies implement a variety of measures, from regulating air pollution, to improving food safety, to vaccination programs, that reduce mortality risk. What are the economic benets of these mortality risk reduction eorts, and how do they vary across the U.S. population?
To address this question, we develop a life cycle model of the consumption and labor supply choice problem facing an individual. Numerically solving this problem under uncertainty in life expectancy and wage income, we assess how much wealth an individual would forego for a marginal reduction in mortality risk. We calibrate the model to labor market, wealth, and longevity data for the United States, and then run a series of simulated laboratory experiments. Each experiment begins with an identical set of 10,000 age-20 agents who make annual consumption and leisure decisions in response to persistent and temporary wage shocks, and agents advance to the next year if they do not face a stochastic mortality shock, until age 100 when all surviving agents die. Through these experiments, we address how the willingness to pay to reduce mortality risk varies with age, income, wealth, and other individual characteristics correlated with longevity expectations, including gender and ethnicity.
Through our simulated lab experiments, we nd the following about the heterogeneity in the value of life. The mean willingness to pay to reduce a marginal reduction in mortality is about one-third larger than the median, and the 95th percentile WTP is about 12 times the 5th percentile WTP for a crosssection of age-45 agents. These results reect the dispersion in incomes that evolves in each experiemnt and enables us to investigate the income elasticity for the willingness to pay to reduce mortality risk. We nd that the elasticity 2 of WTP with respect to the permanent component of wages is about 1.7, while the elasticity of WTP with respect to realized income is about 0.6. This average elasticity across all working agents masks heterogeneity with respect to age: age-60 agents have elasticity estimates less than 1/2 and less than 1/4 the estimates of age-30 agents for these two meaures, respectively. Across most of the income distribution, the WTP to reduce mortality risk follows an inverted-U shape over the life cycle, with the agents bearing the most adverse productivity shocks (and hence lowest incomes) revealing a steadily declining WTP with age. White agents' WTP to reduce mortality risk is signicantly higher than black agents' WTP, with a ratio of about 2 at their life-cycle peaks, and we decompose the drivers of this white-black WTP gap in terms of dierent labor income processes and life expectancy. Finally, we show that men have higher WTP than women, also as a result of higher wages, until about age 70 when longer female life expectancy dominates the dierences in accumulated wealth driven by wage processes.
This analysis makes several contributions to the literature. First, our numerical approach advances the theory and simulation literature focused on valuing mortality risk reduction. Unlike earlier papers that only specied consumption as a choice variable in the life cycle problem (Shepard and Zeckhauser [1984] , Rosen [1988] , Moore and Viscusi [1990] , Johansson [1996] , Hall and Jones [2007] ), our approach allows for the individual to choose optimal consumption and leisure over the life cycle that permits us to better match our model to observed consumption and leisure patterns and to specify willingness to pay for risk reduction as a trade-o among consumption, leisure, and risk. In addition, ours is the rst paper in this literature to explicitly account for uncertainty in the income process. Modeling uninsurable idiosyncratic labor income risk yields consumption and saving behavior consistent with the empirical evidence 3 on precautionary saving among the young and wealth accumulation typically starting in middle age. This has important results for how willingness to pay varies both over the life cycle and across the cross-section of the population. Second, our numerical simulations explain some of the observed variations in the value of a statistical life (VSL) estimates in recent empirical work.
1 In revealed preference and stated preference studies, Aldy and Viscusi [2008] , Viscusi and , Kniesner et al. [2006] , Cameron and DeShazo [2013] , and Krupnick [2007] nd that the VSL generally takes an inverted-U shape over the life cycle.
2 Costa and Kahn [2004] estimate an income elasticity for the VSL of about 1.5 and Kniesner et al. [2010] estimate income elasticities greater than 1.0 from hedonic labor market analyses, although meta-analyses by Viscusi and Aldy [2003] , Mrozek and Taylor [2002] , and Liu and Liu [1997] produce income elasticities in the 0.4 and 0.6 range and Cameron and DeShazo [2013] estimate an income elasticity of about 0.7 based on a stated preference survcey. Viscusi [2004] and Leeth and Ruser [2003] estimate larger VSLs for whites than for blacks in the labor market. Viscusi and Hersch [2008] nd that male workers have larger VSLs than female workers. Our numerical model can provide a theoretical underpinning for these results based on the variation in lifetime income, income shocks, and life expectancy across various demographic groups. Third, our focus on heterogeneity across the population serves as a comple-1 The value of a statistical life is simply the aggregation of a population's willingness to pay for a given risk reduction such that it equals the total amount that population would pay to reduce one statistical mortality. For example, if each member of a population of 10,000 is willing to pay $500 to reduce a 1 in 10,000 risk, then the value of a statistical life for this population is $5 million. Thus, VSL represents a population-expressed measure that aggregates individuals' willingnes to pay to reduce mortality risk. We use both terms in this paper, and in our simulated laboratory experiments, the willingness to pay to reduce mortality risk by one given agent could be considered identical to the VSL for a population of agents that experience identical wage and mortality shocks as this specic agent that represents this population in our experiment.
2 Some studies that evaluate the age-VSL relationship do not nd this result. For example, Smith et al. [2004] show that the VSL may increase with age. Blomquist and O'Conor [2011] nd that VSL follows an inverted-U for adults (aged 30-92 in their sampel), but may be higher for children. Early hedonic wage models that simply included the interaction of age and occupational risk typically found a statistically signicant, negative interaction eect Viscusi and Aldy [2003] . 4 ment to several papers that abstract from the choice under uncertainty characteristic problem and yield national aggregates for the value of a statistical life. For example, [Hall and Jones, 2007] and Murphy and Topel [2006] provide population aggregate estimates for VSL and use these to assess the benets of increasing life expectancy through health care investments. Our approach produces a similar life-cycle shape for age-specic mean VSLs as the Murphy and Topel model, but accounting for gender-specic wage processes produces a dierent result for gender-specic VSLs than they found in a model that only accounts for dierences in life expectancy across gender.
In the next section, we outline the individual's life-cycle model. The third section discusses the calibration of the model and the numerical implementation.
In the fourth section, we employ the model to assess our base case and provide results from these simulations showing how the willingness to pay to reduce mortality risk varies with age, income, ethnicity, and gender. The nal section concludes the paper, and several appendices provide more information on the computational methods and wage prole and variance estimation.
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Life-Cycle Utility Model
Our model captures several important features that play a role in determining an individual's willingness to pay to reduce mortality risk, and hence the population-based measure value of a statistical life. First, the model allows idiosyncratic, age-specic mortality that can dier across demographic groups.
Second, agents face uninsurable wage shocks whose magnitudes can dier across dierent types of agents. Third, agents value both consumption and leisure.
Fourth, agents choose optimally their savings and allocation of time to market work accounting for both earnings and mortality risk. 
Agent's Utility Maximization Problem
Agents choose their consumption and leisure to maximize the discounted sum of future utility:
Agents have a constant, time-invariant rate of time preference β. Their probability of survival to the next period, φ t , diers by age. φ t can dier across agents by ethnicity and gender. This age-dependent survival probability, which declines as agents get older, eectively shortens their time horizon and aects decisions on consumption and leisure as well as their values for mortality risk reduction.
Agents face incomplete markets: private markets for insurance against future wage shocks do not exist, but agents can self-insure through savings. All saving is risk-less and pays the market rate of return. This ability to partially self insure, as well as conduct life-cycle savings, provides a very important means of smoothing consumption in the face of idiosyncratic shocks. There are two uses of an agent's resources: consumption and saving for future consumption.
The agent's resources consist of prior savings, a it , interest on those savings, R it a it , after-tax labor market compensation, w it 1 − τ SS (1 − l it ) (note that we denote labor taxes as τ SS to represent the social security payroll tax rate), and social security benets, b SS it . In each one-year period, the agent allocates one unit of time between leisure, l it , and market work. This yields the agent's budget constraint:
The base case is a borrowing constraint of zero. A borrowing constraint of zero ensures that no agents die in debt:
We also consider cases where agents can borrow by relaxing the condition in equation 4. In these cases the age-dependent borrowing constraint starts fairly loose and rises to zero as the agent ages. The tightening borrowing constraint prevents agents from dying in debt with certainty.
2.2 Wage Process
We draw from the macro-consumption literature a wage process that has both permanent and transitory shocks to characterize the wage risks agents face.
Estimating such a wage process from microeconomic data is consistent with several important empirical features of the U.S. economy, including wages, asset holdings, and consumption [Samwick and Carroll, 1997 , Gourinchas and Parker, 2002 , Storesletten et al., 2004 . 
M t is the economy-wide mean wage in period t and M t−1 is the previous period's mean wage. Their ratio, Mt Mt−1
, gives the deterministic element of wages over the life cycle. The permanent shock, η it , persists into future periods through P it depending on the previous permanent component of wages, P it−1 .
The actual wage received by an agent is:
This is composed of the permanent component, P it , and a purely transitory shock, ε it , representing a shock without persistence. The eects of ε it , except as they persist through dierential asset holdings, disappear after one period.
All agents retire at 65. Although they can choose to retire (by working zero hours) before age 65, they cannot receive Social Security benets, b SS it , until they reach 65. The Social Security benets the agent receives are based on a progressive non-linear transformation of the nal permanent wage similar to the translation between wages and benets in the actual system.
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5 Social security wages are based on nal permanent wage in our model rather than some form of AIME (Average Indexed Monthly Earnings). Basing benets on an AIME-type formula would add an additional state variable to the agent's problem and increase the computational complexity of our exercise while providing little additional value in understanding the heterogeneity in the value of life. 8
Recursive Representation
Given the economic environment outlined above, we can represent the individual's problem recursively: 
Dening the Value of a Statistical Life
Using the above representation of an agent's problem, we dene a discrete time analogue to the more commonly used continuous time denition of mortality risk reduction valuation. Consider, at period t, a small increase in the probability of surviving to the next period ∂φ t . The probability of survival is now φ t + ∂φ t instead of φ t . All future survival probabilities remain unchanged so the
, ε i,t+1 )] also remains unchanged. Since agents change their savings behavior in response to the change in survival probabilities in that one period, the assets carried forward will be dierent and the evaluated expectation will also dier. This allows us to compare two distinct value functions representing agents' utility maximization problem over consumption 9 and leisure. V t (A it , P it , ε it ) is the baseline value function and V *
reects the case of the 1-period increase in agents' survival probabilities. The change in the mortality risk the agents face represents the only dierence in parameters.
To evaluate the value of the mortality risk reduction we consider how much agents would pay for this increase in their survival probability. Consider the change in wealth, ∂A it , such that
This increment ∂A it is the amount of additional wealth that makes the person indierent between living longer in expectation and living the same length of time as before with that additional wealth. The value of a statistical life typically refers to the aggregate willingness to pay of a sub-population to reduce the mortality risk borne by this sub-population equivalent to one statistical fatality. We construct a VSL from this wealth-risk trade-o by assuming a subpopulation of individuals of size 1 ∂φt identical to agent i and aggregating the ∂A it over this sub-population. This yields a VSL of:
Note that since our population is heterogeneous in all of A it , P it and ε it the VSLs are also heterogeneous across the population. We report VSLs throughout this paper to facilitate comparison with the literature.
This corresponds to the denition of the VSL in simple one-period models and most revealed preference studies Aldy, 2003, Johannesson et al., 1997] . For example, hedonic wage models in which the wage is regressed on occupational job mortality risk and other controls yield VSL estimates by dierentiating the estimated wage equation with respect to annual job mortality risk. The VSL is the change in the wage with respect to the change in risk and is given by the estimated coecient for job mortality risk (for linear specications and the coecient scaled by the wage for log-linear specications)
aggregated over a population. This denition corresponds to our one-period change in wealth divided by the one-period increment in the survival probability expressed above.
Model Calibration
The parametrization of our model draws on a variety of sources. We employ some parameters from the literature estimated through simulated method of moments and other life-cycle based microeconometric procedures. We estimate the parameters characterizing the wage process with data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and we employ survival probability estimates from the 2002 U.S. Life Tables.
Agent's Utility
Based on previous research by, among others, French [2005] , ? and Nishiyama and Smetters [2005] we assume that consumption and leisure are non-separable.
The period utility function is:
When v > 1, consumption and work are complements. At lower levels of leisure the marginal utility of consumption increases. Agents who work a lot also consume a lot. γ is the coecient of relative risk aversion over the combined utility from consumption and leisure. We assume γ = 2 and v = 2. A value of 11 2 for γ is quite commonly used in the literature. A value of 2 for v implies that most working agents spend about 1 3
of their time allotment on market work.
These parameters align closely with those estimated for this utility function by French [2005] , who nds that this non-separable specication better ts the empirical data than an additively-separable alternative.
We include a constant k in our utility function, which has no eects on decisions regarding savings, consumption, and leisure. Excluding a constant, We choose k to match the peak VSL estimated in empirical studies. Aldy 
Life-Cycle Pattern and Variance of Wages
We estimate the mean life-cycle pattern of hourly labor compensation using worker data compiled in the PSID over the 1968-1993 period. For the entire population of workers, we nd that labor incomes increase rapidly for workers in their 20s and peak and then decline for workers in their 50s. We have also estimated this deterministic life-cycle wage pattern for various sub-populations by race and gender. We draw from the work of Samwick and Carroll to estimate the permanent and transitory shocks to labor income. Table 2 contains the estimates of the variances for the total sample and various subgroups of interest.
Appendix B provides more details on the construction of the life-cycle wage prole and the permanent and transitory variances.
Survival Probabilities
We use in our model survival probabilities from the 2002 U.S. Life Tables constructed by the National Center for Health Statistics [Arias, 2004] . The Life Tables provide us with the age-conditional probability of surviving to the next year for the whole population, by male and female populations, and by black and white populations. Agents are born into our economic environment at age 20 and can live to be at most 100 at which age they die with certainty. Since less than 1 percent of agents survive to 100, truncating life at that age has no signicant eects on the results. Also note that the U.S. Life Tables do not report age-specic survival probabilities for those older than 100. Security is a powerful risk-sharing tool.
Simulated Laboratory Experiments
For each case, we simulate the model with 10,000 agents. Agents in a given population start with the same initial labor market compensation at age 20, experience identical deterministic wage proles, face the same survival probability prole over the life cycle, and have wage shocks drawn from the same distribution. We introduce the change in the probability of survival for that one period and assess the change in wealth for the alternative value function with the initial probability of survival for each agent necessary to make agents indifferent between the two proles. This generates the age 20 VSLs for the agents.
We then move the agents forward to age 21, subject to an age-specic mortality probability, and replicate the experiment. This proceeds on until age 100 when all agents die. These simulations yield age-specic VSLs for the agents in our model runs. Table 3 presents the experiments that we implemented.
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Willingness to Pay to Reduce Mortality Risk
In contrast to the deterministic simulation models used previously in this literature, our model with uncertainty in the income process allows us to investigate the distribution in VSLs.
6 Figure 1 shows the life-cycle VSL proles for the mean, median, and 5th and 95th percentiles of the 10,000 sample of agents calibrated to the total population.
7 This gure depicts two stark ndings. First, the inverted-U shape is common to most agents across the distribution. The inverted-U takes an even more pronounced shape for those at the upper end of the distribution. For agents who experience a series of very negative shocks, however, the pattern of their VSL can exhibit a quite dierent pattern as it falls over their life cycle, evident by those at the 5th percentile of the distribution.
Second, those agents who experience a sequence of positive permanent labor market shocks have much, much higher VSLs. The mean VSL is nearly 33%
higher at its peak than the median for this population, reecting the eect of the high VSLs on the mean. The VSLs for those at the 95th percentile are an order of magnitude larger than the VSLs for those at the 5th percentile. As the rst analysis to account for uncertainty in the labor income process, we show substantial heterogeneity in the value individuals place on mortality risk reduction simply as a function of the labor compensation outcomes over their life cycle. values. This was the same eect that resulted in the divergence between the mean and the median: the relatively small number of high VSL agents pulls the mean above the median. The mean VSL of about $8 million at age 40 masks the variation over the population. We also nd that the variance of VSL over the life-cycle also follows an inverted-U shape, with higher cross-sectional variances for those agents in their 50s than any other age group. The variance in VSLs declines rapidly starting in the mid-60s because agents are forced into retirement at age 65 and are no longer subject to permanent and transitory wage shocks. Since only the top of the income distribution has substantial amounts of wealth to run down, VSLs decline much more for those at the top of the income distribution than for those at the bottom, resulting in the smaller variance starting at 65. 4.1 Heterogeneity by Age Figure 3 shows the mean age-specic VSL prole for the agents in this base case.
The mean VSL for these agents is about $3 million at age 20, it increases until its peak of $8 million in the mid-forties, and steadily declines over the rest of the life cycle. The inverted-U shape of the VSL reects the ndings in Shepard and Zeckhauser [1984] for their Robinson Crusoe case in which an agent cannot borrow against future income. The inability to insure against idiosyncratic income risk and the non-negative borrowing constraint in our model constrains agents in much the same way as the borrowing constraint in their Robinson
Crusoe case. Our result is driven, however, much more by the inability to insure against income shocks than it is by the borrowing constraint we have also undertaken simulations with looser borrowing constraints and we still nd this inverted-U shape because risk-averse agents are not inclined to borrow 9 This eect is due in large part to the presence of Social Security. Poor agents have little incentive to save since Social Security benets replace a large fraction of their consumption.
substantially from future income under the possibility of future adverse income shocks. Our VSL shape mimics the life cycle pattern of consumption, an analytic result of Johansson's [2002] theoretical model. Our inverted-U shape is generally similar to that of Murphy and Topel (2006) , although we nd a peak a little later in the life-cycle.
In Figure 3 , we have plotted life-cycle hedonic wage VSL estimates from Aldy and Viscusi [2008] . Controlling for both age and cohort eects in panel data of workers, they use a minimum distance estimator to exibly allow for age variation in the wage-occupational mortality risk tradeo (VSL). Recall that we calibrated the additive constant, k, in the utility function to the maximum VSL in Aldy and Viscusi [2008] , but all other model inputs come from dierent sources. While we expect our simulations, on average, to match their peak VSL, there is nothing in our calibration that forces our model to match their life-cycle pattern.
Our model achieves results strikingly similar to their estimates, in terms of both the shape of the VSL prole and VSL levels. The two curves track almost exactly from ages 25 to 55. At low ages our model underpredicts VSL by about $0.5 million, and at older ages our model slightly overpredicts relative to the revealed preference results. Our results also appear similar to the empirical VSL estimates over the life cycle in Kniesner et al. [2006] .
Heterogeneity by Income
This dramatic dispersion in the willingness to pay to reduce mortality risk within and across age cohorts reects the dispersion in incomes as workers' diverge in their productivities in our simulated experiments. Individuals should be willing to pay more for a given mortality risk reduction as their incomes increase. Viscusi and Aldy [2003] estimate an income elasticity for the value of statistical life on the order of 0.5-0.6 in a meta-analysis of hedonic wage studies, while Mrozek and Taylor [2002] estimate an elasticity of 0.46 and Liu and Liu [1997] estimate an elasticity of 0.53. In contrast, Kaplow [2005] argues that the income elasticity should exceed 1.0 based on theoretical grounds and empirical estimates of the coecient of relative risk aversion exceeding 1.0. Murphy and Topel (2006) suggest that the income elasticity should be at least 1. This is consistent with the common empirical nding of an upward sloping labor supply function. Since accumulated wealth also plays a role in determining the willingness to pay for mortality reductions, we also control for it in some regressions. The simulated data from our model runs generate more than 400,000 observations for the all working agents sample and at least 9,200 observations for the age-specic working agents samples. Table 4 presents our estimates of the elasticity of VSL with respect to both the permanent component of wages and the realized labor income of agents.
All estimates generate statistically signicant positive elasticities for VSL with respect to either realized income or permanent wages. When using income, the elasticity of VSL is 0.55 but when using productivity this jumps to 1.71. The productivity measure also does a much better job predicting the value an agent places on these mortality risk reductions with an R 2 of 0.935 as opposed to 0.674.
The regressions with productivity are thus doing a better job of approximating the true function that relates our state variables to VSL.
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Columns (C), (D), (E) and (F) add a variety of controls, including level of assets and a cubic in age. Including these controls has only a modest impact on the two VSL-income elasticity measures. The dierences between the two measures are statistically signicant and are large in economic terms. Table 5 shows substantial variation in the elasticities by age. Young workers have much higher income elasticities: an age-30 worker has an estimated VSLincome elasticity for the permanent component of wages of 2.01, and this declines to 1.56 for an age-45 worker and still further to 0.81 for an age-60 worker.
Likewise, an age-30 worker has a VSL-income elasticity for realized income of 0.82, nearly twice the age-45 estimate of 0.56 and nearly ve times the age-60 estimate of 0.15. For young agents the VSL varies much more with changes in either permanent wages or income than for old agents. Since they have many more years of possibly higher consumption (and/or leisure) from their higher income, they should be willing to pay more to maintain this. Young agents also have the ability to stretch each additional dollar out over more years. Since marginal utility of both consumption and leisure declines with more of either, the same amount of extra consumption spread out over a longer time period raises expected utility more. The larger increase in expected utility for an 10 Theoretically, VSL is a four dimensional function of age, assets, the permanent level of productivity and the transitory shock, VSL it =VSL it (age, a it , P it , ε it ). This function can generally be non-linear. In running the regression we are estimating it as a linear function of these state variables. Errors in the linear regression are thus not random error but deviations of the true underlying function from the linear approximation. Adding more controls thus allows us to better approximate the function. The age-specic regressions we perform later are then separately estimating the series of functions VSL i =VSL i (a i , P i , ε i ), and age is necessarily dropped.
additional dollar of either permanent wages or realized income drives the larger response of WTP to reduce mortality risk for younger agents.
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The substantial dierence between the elasticities with respect to income and permanent wages mirrors the signicant variation in estimated VSL-income elasticities in the revealed preference literature. The elasticity with respect to realized income is closer in spirit to the empirical work that employs crosssectional data to estimate a VSL-income elasticity while the productivity-based VSL elasticity is more akin to estimates that vary across time or over cohorts. 12 Evans and Smith [2010] derive a richer model of individual choice over income and risk than the model in Kaplow [2005] , and they nd how exogenous income shocks aect labor supply decisions and hence the income elasticity of the value of a statistical life. While they do not present estimates of how the income elasticity varies with shocks, they present indirect evidence of how shocks aect labor supply and the coecient of relative risk aversion in an empirical assessment using the Health and Retirement Study. Our results are generally consistent with the implications of their framework.
20
( To illustrate how the elasticity with respect to permanent wages corresponds more closely to how the VSL changes with wages rising over time we undertook the following experiment. We vary the initial wage of agents entering the econ-
omy. An increase in the entering wage persists permanently and increases the permanent component of wages for every agent in the economy. Given this secular increase in permanent incomes, VSLs across the population should also rise and we can consider the elasticity of this with respect to the increase in permanent income.
This approach yields an estimate of the VSL-income elasticity of 1.56.
13 This is comparable to our estimate of the elasticity with respect to the permanent component of wages presented in Table 5 . This elasticity of VSL in response to a secular increase in wages for our model economy supports our interpretation 13 Formally the procedure is very similar to estimating the cross-sectional elasticities above.
We consider increasing the initial wage by 10%, 20%, 50%, 75%, 125% and 200%. We then take the log of the population average of VSL. We then run the regression of this on the log of the initial component of permanent wages. The above estimate is the coecient on initial permanent wages.
above of a dierence between measuring an elasticity with respect to wages and realized labor income.
Heterogeneity by Ethnicity
In the U.S. economy, white and black workers dier in terms of their labor market returns and expected longevity. We assess the extent to which these dierences can impact black and white willingness to pay for risk reduction.
To decompose the eects of dierences in income proles and longevity by race, we present four mean life-cycle VSL patterns in Figure 4 . Two of the patterns are black and white life-cycle VSL proles. The other two reect a modication of a black population characteristic to its white population representation. In one prole, we have modied the black population calibrated model so that it is has the white population's deterministic wage prole and labor market income variances while maintaining black population survival probabilities. In the other prole, we have modied the black population calibrated model so that it maintains the black population's deterministic wage prole and labor market income variances while having the white population survival probabilities.
The modest dierence in the initial (age 20) VSLs between blacks and whites reects the longer longevity and higher expected future incomes for whites.
White VSLs peak at over $9 million in their late forties, nearly double the peak for blacks at a similar age, comparable to the Viscusi [2003] ndings. Figure   4 clearly shows that the vast majority of the dierence in VSL between blacks and whites results from their dierences in wages. Improving the survival rates of black agents to the levels of white agents only yields a small increase in the mean VSL, closing less than ten percent of the gap between peaks. The very modest eect of changing survival probabilities at early stages of life reects the eect of discounting. A 20-year old worker expecting to live to 73 (black life expectancy conditional on reaching 20) or 78 (white life expectancy) would not value these dierences much since they would occur more than 50 years in the future. The gure does show that moving from black survival probabilities to white survival probabilities does increase in absolute and percentage terms the VSL for those at older ages because they have fewer years over which to discount before enjoying the longer life expectancy. Improving the black wage prole to match the white wage prole closes over ninety percent of the gap between the VSLs.
The dierence in wages between blacks and whites appears to drive the dierences in VSL that have been observed in the empirical literature. Research by Viscusi [2003] based on hedonic wage models shows that black workers have a value of statistical life equal to about one-half that of white workers. Thus, our analysis suggests that this white-black gap could be explained by dierences in labor income and life expectancy, as opposed to unobserved dierences in attitudes toward risk.
Heterogeneity by Gender
Men and women dier in both their labor market compensation (mean and variances) and their life expectancy. Based on the 2002 Life Tables, women should expect to live 5.5 years longer than men. This should increase the VSL of women relative to men. Countering this eect, however, is the higher labor market compensation men experience. We assess the life-cycle VSLs for men and women to discern which of these two eects dominate.
In our simulations, female VSLs peak in their late forties, about ve years later than the male VSL peak, reecting the eects of dierences in life expectancy. At their peaks, men have VSLs of about $8 million, more than 33% greater than women's VSLs of about $6 million at their peak. Averaged over the working years of 20-65, the ratio of female-to-male VSLs in our simulations comes to about 0.87, which is modestly larger than the female-to-male VSL ratio of 0.75 in the labor market hedonic analysis by Viscusi and Hersch [2008] .To decompose the eects of dierences in income proles and longevity by gender, we present four mean life-cycle VSL patterns in Figure 5 . Two of the patterns are male and female life-cycle VSL proles. The other two reect a modication of a female population characteristic to its male population representation. In one prole, we have modied the female population calibrated model so that it is has the male population's survival probabilities while maintaining the female deterministic wage prole and labor market income variances. In the other prole, we have modied the female population calibrated model so that it has the male population's deterministic wage prole and labor market income variances while maintaining the female survival probabilities.
The gure illustrates that the vast majority of the dierences in VSL between males and females, as in the black-white comparison, derives from diering wage processes. Giving females the shorter lives of males results in only a modest reduction in their VSL. Since wages for females increase at a slower rate than those of males, their VSL also rises less steeply and has a longer plateau than the male VSL. Giving females the wages of males, however makes a substantial dierence. With their longer life expectancies, their VSL now surpasses that of males at all ages. The mortality dierence makes little dierence in the shape with VSLs as males' and females' VSLs have almost the exact same shape once they have the same pattern of wages.
Our results dier from work by Murphy and Topel (2006) , which shows female VSLs exceeding male VSLs in their simulation model. This reects their assumption that males and females only dier according to survival probabili-ties. Thus, their analysis is eectively similar to a comparison of the life-cycle VSL patterns in Figure 5 for male wages and male life expectancy to male wages and female life expectancy, or a comparison for female wages and female life expectancy and female wages and male life expectancy. Since we do not assume the same income prole for men and women in these experiments, we nd a dierent male-female VSL relationship.
Conclusion
We have developed a numerical life-cycle model that is novel to the mortality risk reduction literature by accounting for choice over consumption and leisure and stochastic wage and mortality processes. Our calibrated model matches several important regularities in the U.S. economy, including life cycle consumption patterns, precautionary saving among young adults, wealth accumulation starting in middle age, and labor market compensation and participation outcomes.
The realism of the model and the accounting for uncertainty allows us to explore important questions on the value of mortality risk reductions that existing theoretical and simulation models cannot address, and our simulated laboratory experiments serve as a bridge between the theoretical and empirical literatures.
We nd that the value agents' place on reductions in mortality risk (or their population-equivalent VSL) varies substantially with income and assets.
Accounting for empirically estimated life cycle wage patterns and idiosyncratic labor market compensation shocks yields a wide range of VSL estimates both over the life cycle and across the population. The mean, median, 95th percentile, and variances of the VSL follow an inverted-U shape over the life cycle, peaking in agents' mid-40s at about the same point in the life cycle as the peak in consumption. Agents who experience very negative labor market shocks have a VSL that declines over their life cycle, as evident by the 5th percentile of the distribution. The mean VSL substantially exceeds the median as the VSL distribution is non-normal with an extremely fat, long upper end tail. The peak
VSLs for agents at the 95th percentile are an order of magnitude larger than the peak VSLs for those at the 5th percentile of the distribution. The inverted-U shape is driven by the idiosyncratic labor market shocks that we assume, consistent with real-world practice, are uninsurable (except through savingsbased self insurance). Accounting for these labor market shocks, extending beyond the current VSL literature, allows us to characterize the entire agespecic VSL distribution and not just a single, deterministic series of values.
The elasticity of the VSL with respect to income diers substantially between the wage and realized income. Estimating the elasticity with respect to realized income ignores the substantial value that agents place on leisure. We nd that the VSL-income elasticity for all working agents based on the permanent component of the wage is on the order of 1.5, three times greater than the estimate for realized income. We believe that this dierence, only evident in such a model with leisure choice and a stochastic labor market compensation process over the life cycle, explains the dierence in VSL-income elasticities in the revealed preference literature: the permanent wage results are consistent with cohort-based income elasticities and the realized income results are consistent with cross-sectional results. We also show that the VSL-income elasticity declines signicantly with age for both income measures.
We have also assessed how the VSL varies over the life cycle by race and gender. We nd that dierences in the life cycle wage process and mortality prole drive the substantial dierences in VSLs between blacks and whites and males and females. Assuming no preference heterogeneity across demographic groups, we show that virtually all of the black-white gap in recent revealed preference research can be explained by labor market compensation. Although the longer female life expectancy should increase female VSLs relative to males' VSLs, the higher labor market compensation for men more than osets this eect.
Our results may have several implications for future research. First, the dispersed and skewed distribution of agents' VSLs indicates that empirical estimates based on assumptions of normality might be biased. Second, these results suggest the possibility of explaining some other observed risk anomalies based on the agents' position in wage and asset distributions. Third, our estimates of an elasticity in response to changes in wages substantially in excess of one implies that as an economy becomes richer more resources might be devoted to health care and other measures to reduce mortality risk.
The substantial heterogeneity in the VSL over the life cycle and across the population could have several implications for the application of VSL estimates to mortality risk reduction policy proposals. First, the life cycle variation in the value of statistical life in this study does not support current EPA practice of a constant VSL irrespective of age or the past FDA practice of a constant value of a statistical life-year irrespective of age. The inverted-U life cycle pattern we nd implies that EPA practice overestimates the benets of mortality risk reduction for the elderly and underestimates the benets of risk reduction for prime-aged adults and FDA practice overestimates the benets of mortality risk reduction for young adults. Second, the VSL-income elasticity results can inform assessments of long-term mortality risk reduction policies, such as reducing UV-B exposure through the phase-out of chlorouorocarbons. Such policies would reduce mortality risk for future generations that would be expected to have higher lifetime incomes and would be willing to pay more for risk reduction.
Third, the heterogeneity across the population suggests that a one-size ts all VSL would not appropriately reect how much individuals would be willing to 27 pay for risk reduction if they had such an opportunity to do so in a competitive market. For proposed policies that may aect the mortality risk prole for a specic demographic group, population-specic VSLs may be appropriate.
Given the negative response to the so-called senior discount used by EPA in its 2002 evaluation of the Clear Skies Initiative, this may raise political and ethical concerns (see discussion in Aldy and Viscus [2007] ). Such concerns may be entirely legitimate for those contexts in which at least some of the dierences in lifetime incomes and wage proles, and hence estimated VSLs, reect gender-or ethnic-specic discrimination in labor markets (see discussion in Viscusi [2010] We represent the represented the agent's problem recursively as:
For each value of the discrete state, the transitory wage shock, there is a grid over assets and wages. Solutions generally use 3 transitory shocks. The grid over assets and wages has 20 points for both assets and wages. Adding more grid points does not signicantly change any of the decisions or aggregate quantities of the model. Since the decision rules feature high levels of curvature at low levels of assets and wages and much lower curvature at higher levels we use a non-equally spaced grid. The density of the grid increases at lower levels of both wages and assets to better account for the rapid changes in the value function.
Shape-preserving splines approximate the value function between grid points.
14 An example is the common normalization of using the homothecity of the value function to reduce the state variable to A+P P , the ratio of assets plus permanent income to permanent income. Since we have both a permanent and transitory shock combined with an endogenous labor supply decision we lose this convenient normalization.
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The value function inherits the monotonicity underlying the utility function.
Agents always prefer more assets and higher wages. This implies that approximation methods which preserve this are preferred. We employ two-dimensional Akima shape-preserving splines, which are relatively fast and ecient [Schneider and Eberly, 2003] . Importantly these splines provide information not only about the function but also its derivative. This is necessary to use the much faster Newton's method based optimization algorithms described below.
To solve the individual's problem at each of these grid points we use the OPT++ library of Mesa [1994] . This package solves general non-linear programming problems with arbitrary constraints.
Starting in the last period the solution is simple, do not work and consume everything. We then know the the value function V 80 (corresponding to age-100 agents) at our grid points. The splines described above approximate the value function over the entire area. Given V 80 , we then solve for V 79 taking V 80 as given and construct splines again. From this the algorithm iterates back to the beginning of an agent's economic life at age 0 (age-20 agents).
When solving for the optimum in the value function we also get decision rules for consumption and leisure. Since these are again on the grid the same spline procedure approximates them.
B Life-Cycle Wage Estimation
We estimate the life-cycle pattern of labor market compensation from Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data over 1968-1993. We limit the sample to heads of household between 20 and 65 years of age working at least 1,000 hours per year. We also exclude heads of household with top-coded income.
This results in a sample of 107,381 observations for 11,040 households. Labor market compensation measures are converted to constant year 2000 dollars using the CPI-Urban deator. We then convert labor market incomes to hourly rates and take the natural logarithm of these values.
We estimate the deterministic life cycle component of labor market compensation by specifying the log of wages as a quintic function of age. This quintic version yields very similar life cycle labor market compensation proles as more exible specications, such as those with age-specic dummy variables, but this more parsimonious parametric form allows for more ecient numerical simulation. Wages increase steeply for young agents between 20 and 30. Wages peak at around age fty and decline thereafter. We have also estimated such age quintic specications by gender and by race to complement the results for the total population and facilitate our analysis of the heterogeneity of the value of life across demographic characteristics.
To characterize the variance in labor market compensation as the eect of both permanent and transitory shocks, we employ the variance decomposition method developed by Samwick and Carroll [1997] . For our sample, we rst remove the predictable component of labor market compensation. We regress the log of the hourly wage on demographic characteristics, age, education, industry, occupation, interactions of these terms, and year dummy variables. We normalize a worker's wage by constructing the ratio of the actual wage to the predicted wage from this regression. For each worker in a given year we dierence labor market incomes by subtracting previous years' incomes from the current year's income:
∆y td = y t+d − y t ∀d = 1, . . . , D
Having removed the predictable component of labor market income, the square of these dierences should represent the variance in labor market income 41 over time. Samwick and Carroll [1997] show how this can be decomposed into permanent and transitory shocks to income by OLS regression on a worker-byworker basis of these dierences on the time length associated with the dierence, d, and the constant 2:
The coecient estimates yield the permanent and transitory income shocks.
Following Samwick and Carroll, we exclude observations with d of 1 or 2 to ensure that our results do not suer from serial correlation.
